DEUTSCHE BANK FIRE - CONFLICTING POLICIES LEAD TO WRONGFUL TRANSFER OF FIRE DEPT CAPTAIN PETER BOSCO

August 29, 2007
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact:

John Bosco
Bosco, Bisignano & Mascolo, Esqs.
292 Nelson Avenue
Staten Island, New York, 10308
(Mobile) 718-513-9880
(Work) 718-273-4046 (Ext 704)
Personal Attorney for Peter Bosco

PRESS RELEASE

My brother mourns the death of his fellow firefighters in the August 18, 2007 fire at the Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street in Manhattan.  He also hopes that a full and fair investigation will be done so lessons can be learned and future tragedies avoided.  

Captain Peter Bosco and the firefighters of Engine 10, week after week, diligently inspected hundreds of buildings occupied by thousands of people to ensure their safety.  

Why not 130 Liberty Street?

Captain Bosco was recently assigned to Engine 10.  He inherited an existing policy of non-inspection of 130 Liberty Street. He did not originate it.  The policy of non-inspection was in place before he arrived at Engine 10.  

And, at the time Captain Bosco came to Engine 10, the policy made sense.  

The policy of not inspecting 130 Liberty Street was to protect firefighters from exposure to deadly and noxious airborne toxins.

A Building Filled With Toxins
 
That 130 Liberty Street was in the process of being demolished was not its defining  characteristic.  Its defining characteristic was that it was a building in the process of being decontaminated. It was a toxic building contaminated by asbestos, 9/11 dust and other noxious toxins.  Keep in mind that 130 Liberty Street was not taken down more quickly because of the fear that deadly and noxious toxins would fill the air of downtown Manhattan. The residents of downtown Manhattan were entitled to be protected from the toxins of 130 Liberty Street. But so too were firefighters.  One of the lessons learned post 9/11 arose from the death and illness suffered by rescue workers exposed to toxins at ground zero.  Look at how many rescue workers have fallen victim to their exposure to the 9/11 toxins!  The policy of non-inspection of 130 Liberty Street originated on account of its toxic condition. The policy of non-inspection safeguarded firefighters from exposure to its noxious and deadly toxins.

Conflicting Policies

Hence, there was a conflict in policies.  One policy called for no inspections to protect firefighters from exposure to toxins at 130 Liberty Street.  The other policy called for inspections to make sure fire codes were being complied with.  The decision as to which policy to follow was made before Captain Bosco arrived at Engine 10.  Moreover, the recognition and resolution of conflicts in policies is the responsibility of those higher up the chain of command than Captain Bosco and the two other fire officers who were summarily reassigned.  

There are questions that need to be asked.  

An Inspection Plan for Toxic Buildings

1)    What plan did the NYFD have in place to inspect buildings contaminated by toxins?  How were inspections of toxic buildings supposed to be made and at what frequency and by what unit of the NYFD equipped by what gear and given what training?  Did the NYFD have such a written plan?  Did NYFD share this plan with the officers and firefighters of Engine 10?

Haz-Mat Outfits

2)    If you visit the site of 130 Liberty Street now you will see firefighters on the scene protected by Haz-Mat Suits.  All of them.  Before the tragedy, how many Haz-Mats suits were delivered to firefighters at Engine 10. How frequent were the deliveries?  Did Engine 10 get enough Haz-Mat suits to be able to perform inspections at  twice monthly intervals?  It is one thing to ask firefighters to swim through a cesspool of toxins.  It is quite another thing to give them the proper gear to accomplish the task.

Decontamination Gear

3)    What type of post- inspection decontamination gear was Engine 10 given so they could perform twice monthly inspections?  What decontamination process was in place before the tragedy? How long would Engine 10 have been out of service waiting for their gear to be decontaminated?


Who had the Equipment and Training?

4)    What unit of the NYFD at the time of the tragedy had the gear and the training to safely inspect toxic premises?

Kierkegaard observed that we live forward while we learn backward. In other words, hindsight is clearer than foresight. At the time of this tragedy there were two conflicting policies that the NYFD, at its highest levels, failed to recognize and failed to resolve.  Both policies made sense.  

When society was barbaric, human sacrifices were thrown into volcanoes to appease the angry gods.  This singular honor was not bestowed upon the royalty and nobility. Lesser members of society were given the opportunity to meet the volcano.  Three innocent officers of the NYFD are now being marched up the slopes of the volcano. Yet, the recognition and resolution of conflicting policies does not come from the bottom up but from the top down - above the chain of command of these three officers. The wrong men are being fed to the volcano.   Thank God and the Constitution of the United States of America that we have a free press who can ask the right questions to expose the truth.